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I. INTRODUCTION
This Festschrift Essay celebrating the scholarship of Martha Chamallas just
may be the most daunting piece of writing I have attempted—both because of
my desire to do justice to the work of a dear friend and mentor, and because it
is no simple feat to synthesize and contextualize the contributions of a prolific
scholar whose writings span nearly four decades. The risk of lapsing into
genuflecting praise, unworthy of the critical texture of the work itself, looms
large. But for me at least, the payoff far outweighs the risk, as it gave me the
opportunity to reread a body of work by one of the most influential feminist
legal scholars in the academy. It is a collection of work that remains as urgent
as ever.
Martha is quintessentially a feminist legal scholar—with each of these terms
equally defining. Her scholarship brings a critical feminist lens to the law, and
a legal analysis to feminism. Because employment discrimination is a major site
of law’s engagement with gender, it is the subject of much of Martha’s
scholarship. But hers is a body of work that transcends any single doctrinal
category. Martha’s explorations of law span a wide range of areas beyond
 Deborah Brake is Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, John E.

Murray Faculty Scholar, and Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. She is a
nationally recognized scholar on gender equality and the law, with expertise in Title IX and
athletics, sexual harassment and sexual violence, employment discrimination, pregnancy
discrimination, and retaliation.
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discrimination law, including criminal law (rape and other sexual harms), civil
remedies, constitutional law, and torts.1
Feminist legal scholarship is often categorized as either applied or
theoretical,2 but I see no such distinction in Martha’s work. I quickly discarded
any idea of dividing her work along these lines. Even Martha’s earliest articles,
which initially struck me as applied, upon rereading, blurred this boundary.3 For
instance, one of her early articles examined legal challenges to formally genderneutral rules governing female-dominated jobs.4 Precisely because they are
mostly (but not entirely) held by women, such jobs are subjected to low pay,
few benefits, and restrictive regulations that reveal little respect for the
employees who hold them.5 Published in 1984, the article canvasses the case
law to propose adapting disparate treatment doctrine to reach such practices.6
But it also marks the beginning of theorizing what Martha comes to call
devaluation7 as a distinctive type of oppression. Martha’s scholarship bolsters
the refrain that the best theoretical work is engaged and rife with practical
implications. At the same time, her body of work shows that the best applied
1 Because no single essay can cover the entirety of her work, I leave Martha’s

groundbreaking scholarship on torts to other contributors to this issue. For a selection of
Martha’s torts scholarship, see generally FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TORT OPINIONS
(Martha Chamallas & Lucinda M. Finley eds., 2020); MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B.
WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010); Martha
Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #Me Too Moment?, 11 J. TORT L. 39 (2018); Martha
Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527 (2013); Martha
Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party Criminal
Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351 (2010); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination
and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115
(2007); Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 751 (2001); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); and Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of RaceSpecific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994).
2 See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 3 (3d
ed. 2013) [hereinafter CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY]
(categorizing feminist legal scholarship as “practical” or “theoretical”).
3 See Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work: The Case for Pay Equity and
Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 710 (1986) [hereinafter Chamallas, Women and PartTime Work]. See generally Martha Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum” of
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum”]. See generally
Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983)
[hereinafter Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality].
4 Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum,” supra note 3, at 4.
5 See id. at 2.
6 Id. at 39–50.
7 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 755 (2001) [hereinafter
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias].
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scholarship goes beyond doctrine and concrete applications to grapple with the
bigger questions of theory. Much feminist scholarship in recent decades has
been heading in this integrated direction, striving to bridge the gap between
theory and practice and to ground theory in activism.8
One of many things that stands out for me in rereading Martha’s scholarship
is her uncanny ability to shape how a field is understood in the process of
synthesizing it. Her foundational book Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory9
does that masterfully—constructing feminist legal theory as it synthesizes it,
building new understandings from the encounters with the work she
catalogues.10 In the spirit of that book’s articulation of a numbered list of several
key “moves” in feminist legal thinking,11 I have fashioned this Essay around ten
core lessons I have gleaned from reading Martha’s scholarship. No one of these
insights is uniquely attributable to Martha, as she would be the first to point out.
But they are all signature themes in Martha’s scholarship. That these lessons
still resonate and continue to generate new applications and insights speaks to
the richness of Martha’s legacy as a scholar.
What follows are my top ten takeaways from Martha’s scholarship relating
to gender, law, and feminism.

II. FEMINISM IS PLURAL
It is not enough to attend to feminism as a lens for studying law; we must
engage with feminisms. Martha’s scholarship embraces a plurality of feminisms
rather than a singular, one-dimensional version of legal feminism. While many
scholars speak in terms of waves or generations,12 Martha parses the brands and
strands of feminist legal theory by their substance.13 Although, as she points out
in her book, they roughly align by decade in terms of their launching points and
heydays, the various models of feminist legal theory overlap chronologically

8 See, e.g., ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL

THEORY 4 (2006); Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Feminist
Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U.
BALT. L. REV. 167, 168 (2018); Emily M.S. Houh & Kristin Kalsem, It’s Critical: Legal
Participatory Action Research, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 287, 287 (2014).
9 See generally CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note
2.
10 Another example is her treatise, MARTHA CHAMALLAS, PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 2–3 (2019) (describing current doctrine and precedents while pushing
the law in a more employee-protective direction).
11 CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 4–15.
12 See, e.g., Robin West, Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist
Legal Theory, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 980–81 (2018); Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding
Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal
Theory, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 255 (2013).
13 See CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 17–
19.
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and coexist simultaneously to varying degrees.14 Dividing these approaches into
waves or timeframes alone would give a false picture of a linear progression
followed by obsolescence.15
One reason this pluralism matters is that understanding feminism’s
influence on law (or lack thereof) requires parsing the different strands of
feminist legal theory. Martha does this masterfully in an important article about
the changing role of consent in regulating sex.16 Published in 1988, Consent,
Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct examines the law’s
relationship to sex and consent at a time when these topics were finally drawing
serious scholarly attention.17 The article remains one of the most illuminating
works of the era, with the 1980s being the decade in which dominance feminism
flourished and gained influence in the academy.18 With forays into several areas
of law, including the criminal law of rape, civil rights statutes, and common law
civil actions, the article identifies a nascent, feminist-inspired approach to the
regulation of sex, which Martha calls the egalitarian approach.19 Martha
contrasts this approach with two that came before, the traditional approach and
the liberal approach.20
The article traces this evolution, beginning with the traditional approach in
which status (e.g., marital status, age, and ancestry) defined the legality, and
hence cultural legitimacy, of sexual relationships.21 From there, the law
progressed to a liberal approach in which consent became the touchstone for
legality and legitimacy, with the understanding that consensual sex is private
and insulated from state control.22 From this backdrop and her reading of more
recent developments, Martha discerns a newer, developing approach influenced
by feminism, which she calls egalitarian.23 In her reading, the egalitarian
approach is partially a product of the inadequacy of the liberal account of
consent, which feminist critique exposed as falsely equating “choice” with
sexual freedom, and its failure to recognize how law and culture construct and
constrain women’s sexual choices.24 Prior to the egalitarian approach,
liberalism had pushed back against the traditional account but with a different
critique attacking the law’s reliance on arcane status-based categories.25 The
14 Id. at 17–18.
15 See Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J.

GENDER & L. 157, 158 (2010) [hereinafter Chamallas, Past as Prologue].
16 Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 814 (1988) [hereinafter Chamallas, Consent].
17 Id. at 777–78.
18 Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An AntiEssentialist Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 40 (2009).
19 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 835–36.
20 Id. at 780–84.
21 Id. at 784–90.
22 Id. at 790–95.
23 Id. at 835.
24 Id. at 841–43.
25 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 793.
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new egalitarian understanding of a right to mutuality and honesty in sexual
relationships buoyed women’s claims of sexual abuse, as well as broader civil
claims for dishonesty and fraud in sexual relationships.26 Published decades
before the Title IX movement that culminated in the Obama-era strengthening
of the rules on campus sexual misconduct,27 the article presages an emerging
vision of sexual relationships grounded in equality and shaped by newer,
feminist understandings of law.
After constructing this genealogy, Martha argues that the egalitarian
approach is capacious enough to embrace the main strands of feminism of the
day.28 She explains that the egalitarian approach captures dominance
feminism’s focus on power and the centrality of sex and sexuality in men’s
exercise of power over women.29 But, she argues, the egalitarian approach also
accommodates sex-positive feminism’s appreciation of sex for pleasure and
emotional intimacy.30 Instead of treating dominance feminism and sex-positive
feminism as oppositional to one another and mutually exclusive, as they are
conventionally understood, Martha shows how these different brands of
feminist legal theory not only can coexist, but actually reinforce one another in
pressing for an egalitarian approach to sex.31 Dominance feminism and sexpositive feminism converge in delegitimizing sexual coercion and the trading of
sex for money, power, prestige, or security because the lack of mutuality makes
the reciprocity of the transaction suspect, leading to alienation and
objectification.32
Delving into the nuances of the various models of feminism also illuminates
the limits of law reform. For example, in the case of sex crimes prosecutions,
the shift away from the traditional status-based approach to defining unlawful
sex did not lead to reforms in the law’s treatment of prostitution, which did not
follow the trend to deregulate consensual sex.33 Martha attributes this to
disagreements among feminists over the relationship between consent and
prostitution.34 The view associated with dominance feminism highlights the

26 Id. at 796–97.
27 See generally Nancy Chi Cantalupo, The Title IX Movement Against Campus Sexual

Harassment: How a Civil Rights Law and a Feminist Movement Inspired Each Other, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FEMINISM AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Deborah L. Brake,
Martha Chamallas & Verna Williams eds., forthcoming 2022).
28 See Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 841–43.
29 See id. at 842.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 841.
33 Id. at 794.
34 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 794.
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likely abuse of sex workers by johns,35 law enforcement,36 and pimps.37 This
contrasts with another feminist perspective, associated with sex positivism or
partial agency feminism, that prioritizes autonomy in enabling women to profit
from sex as much as any other commodity and contests the puritanical norms
that treat women’s sexuality as sacrosanct.38 But even here, Martha explains,
sex positivism encompasses a wider range of differing views among feminists
than is often acknowledged.39 Purchasing sex under conditions of economic
inequality bears the whiff of coercion, which alienates sex workers from sexual
pleasure.40 The complexity of the transaction, the prospect that the economic
coercion stems more from social conditions than the transaction itself, and the
(appearance of) agency on the part of the sex worker in initiating the transaction
make this a difficult area for feminist consensus.41 Martha’s analysis, while
mapping the divergence of these brands of feminism, also reveals broadly
overlapping perspectives among feminists: a refusal to penalize sex workers
themselves, a recognition of the need to address the economic inequalities that
leave sex workers with few economic alternatives, and agreement on the need
for a better understanding of the lived realities of sex workers.42 Martha’s
complex account upends the reductionist story of “feminist sex wars” that
simplistically portrays feminists as intractably divided into separate “camps.”43
By disentangling the feminisms at work in the egalitarian approach to sex,
Martha neither accentuates the conflict between feminisms’ brands nor glosses
over the tensions to present a unified façade. Instead, she brings them into
dialogue. Through such dialogue, the picture that emerges is not that of a
fracture in feminist theory as much as a split over tactics and strategy, and
disagreement over social facts.
Such nuance in feminist theory divergence is also at the heart of Martha’s
analysis of the split between the “equal treatment” and “special treatment”
feminists over the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in the 1980s.44 When
the Supreme Court took up a challenge to California’s conferral of a right to
leave and reinstatement specifically for pregnant workers, with no equivalent
right granted to workers incapacitated due to other conditions, the equal
35 Clients of prostitutes are referred to as “johns.” In the 1980s and 1990s, many state
legislatures enacted legislation, collectively referred to as “anti-john laws,” which targeted
customers of prostitutes. See Julie Lefler, Note, Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving
Toward Equal Treatment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 26–34 (1999).
36 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 827–28.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 828.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 829.
42 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 830.
43 Id. at 840–41.
44 CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 51–56.
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treatment and special treatment feminists took opposing positions on the case.45
The New York and D.C. women’s groups argued that the state law violated the
PDA, while feminist groups from California argued that pregnancy’s distinctive
role in women’s reproductive lives justified the law’s allowance of the different,
more generous, treatment of pregnancy.46 The split between formal and
substantive equality appears intractable until, digging deeper, Martha explains
that the two “camps” were not so far apart after taking into account their longterm strategies and goals.47 The equal treatment feminists did not seek to
invalidate the law, but to extend the state’s benefits to workers with other
disabilities.48 They did not quarrel so much with pregnancy’s distinctive role in
women’s lives and centrality to women’s inequality as with the social fact (a
predictive judgment) of how the different treatment of pregnancy might harm
women’s employment prospects by making them costlier workers.49 Both the
equal treatment and special treatment feminists agreed on the centrality of
pregnancy to women’s equality and the end goal that workers should have leave
and reinstatement rights accommodating the effects of pregnancy on work.50
Their disagreement was over the right mix of long-term and short-term
strategies for getting there.51
By attending to where the brands and strands of feminist legal theory
overlap and diverge, and engaging all the feminisms in the room, new insights
emerge to light a path forward and out of the shadows of what had seemed an
intractable conflict. In the present moment, where a full-scale backlash threatens
to silence critical race theory and allied critical movements, including feminism,
as too “divisive,”52 another reason for the urgency of resisting simplistic,
homogenous views of feminism comes to mind. These backlash waves ride on
a grotesque caricature of the targeted theory as a simplistic and monolithic
dogma. Parsing the brands and strands of critical theory and resisting overly
simplistic unidimensional accounts is necessary to resist the “strawman”
simplification that underlies the backlash.

45 Id. at 55.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 55–56.
51 Id.
52 See Janice Gassam Asare, Why Does Everything Have to Be About Race?, FORBES

(Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2021/10/28/why-does-everythinghave-to-be-about-race/?sh=7ebe3de951d0 (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). See
generally CONNY ROGGEBAND & ANDREA KRIZSÁN, UN WOMEN, DEMOCRATIC
BACKSLIDING AND THE BACKLASH AGAINST WOMEN’S RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING THE
CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR FEMINIST POLITICS (June 2020), https://www.unwomen.org/sites
/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/SecSecti/Library/Publications/2020/Discussion-paperDemocratic-backsliding-and-the-backlash-against-womens-rights-en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8WMT-9X8F].
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III. GENDER IS INTERSECTIONAL
At the close of the 1980s and the dawn of the new decade, intersectionality
exploded onto the scene, as Black feminists, women of color and third world
women intervened in both the gender-neutrality of critical race theorists and the
inattention to race in feminist legal theory.53 Kimberlé Crenshaw advanced the
term “intersectionality” to capture the crucial insight that neither gender nor race
exist on a singular axis, and to reveal the ways in which the dominant narratives
of race and gender marginalize the experiences of Black women, who sit at the
intersection of gender and race oppression.54 Crenshaw and other Black
feminists and women of color identifying as critical race feminists challenged
feminist theory to attend to the intersection of bias and to eschew essentialist
understandings of gender proceeding from the false premise that gender
operates independently of race.55 The call to “do” gender intersectionally
continues to reverberate in feminist legal scholarship, functioning as both
critique and methodology.
Around this time, Martha took up the challenge of intersectionality in
exploring the interrelation of gender and race and the importance of perspective
in the controversy over Title VII’s objective standard for measuring a hostile
environment.56 Martha finds both promise and peril in the turn toward a situated
perspective that takes into account a plaintiff’s race and gender in assessing the
reasonableness of experiencing a hostile environment.57 On the one hand,
evaluating severity from a situated perspective, such as a reasonable woman or
a reasonable African American employee, has the “potential to challenge the
authority of the dominant group’s account of events.”58 On the other hand,
taking a situated perspective such as the reasonable woman “might backfire if
courts, lawyers, and other legal actors lose sight of the critique of objectivity
and instead treat the women’s view as in women’s minds only,” thereby

53 See Emily Houh, A Genealogy of Intersectionality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

FEMINISM AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 27 (manuscript at 2).
54 For classic foundational works on intersectionality, see generally Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, and Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
55 Houh, supra note 53 (manuscript at 2, 4–5, 10–11) (discussing interventions by
scholars like Mari Matsuda, Patricia Williams, Margaret Montoya, and Angela Harris). For
an early influential critique of gender essentialism, see generally Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
56 See generally Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple
Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992)
[hereinafter Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity].
57 Id. at 96.
58 Id. at 122–23.
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essentializing a gendered perspective and missing the all-important role of
social construction.59
More specifically, Martha flags three distinctive dangers: first, that of
naturalizing difference when accounting for the importance of gender or race in
appreciating the plaintiff’s perspective; second, having to trust judges to choose
between conflicting accounts and assess reasonableness from a victim’s
perspective; and finally, the inherent difficulty in formulating legal standards
that attend to the “diversity within traditionally subordinated groups.”60 The
biggest danger she flags is that in setting themselves up as the final arbiters of
plaintiffs’ “reasonableness” in their perception of harm, judges will fall back on
essentialist stereotypes “that will do little to change the distribution of power in
the workplace.”61 On the other hand, Martha admits, without an objective
standard for assessing a plaintiff’s experience, each individual’s understanding
of their experience would determine reasonableness.62 While at first glance, this
may have some appeal, Martha reminds us that individuals form their
perceptions under conditions of inequality.63 Accordingly, there is a risk that
individuals’ subjective experiences will reinstate the very social inequality the
law should be subverting.64 And yet, because judges tend to resist crediting the
subjective experiences of harassment victims, the bigger risk is that courts will
require a unanimity of views among women to find a woman’s account
reasonable, and insist on a shared viewpoint common to all women while
ignoring the importance of diversity among women, including with respect to
race, class, and sexual orientation.65 If employers and judges use disagreements
among women to undermine a feminist account of reasonableness, the legal
standard will reinforce a reductionist, biological account of how gender
influences perspective.66
Reckoning with these risks, Martha explains, requires resisting notions of
uniformity among women and acknowledging that there is no singular
“women’s” perspective.67 Rather than falling back on majoritarian norms to
gauge reasonableness, Martha argues for using the perspective of a person in the
position of the plaintiff (with respect to the plaintiff’ holistic identity) who is
seeking equality and advancement in the workplace.68 Even though some
workers surely have learned to accommodate gender and race hierarchies at
59 Id. at 123.
60 Id. at 123–24.
61 Id. at 131.
62 Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 56, at 131.
63 Id.
64 For this point, Martha gives the shrewd example of a case in which a woman took

offense at the language and sexual openness of her boss, who was gay. Id. at 131 n.159
(discussing Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, 742 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
65 Id. at 131–32.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 131–37.
68 Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 56, at 139–40.
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work, their acquiescence in racist and sexist norms and harassing behaviors
should not undermine the reasonableness of the perspective of the plaintiff who
challenges these norms.
Martha’s attention to difference among women and resistance to any
singular “women’s” perspective leads her to press the claims of women of color
seeking legal redress of intersectional bias.69 Acknowledging the importance of
perspective demands attention to how race and gender simultaneously shape
perspective. Martha rejects the “ordinary legal practice” of forcing claimants to
segment their identity as either/or race or gender, and argues instead for an
approach to the question of perspective that recognizes multiple oppression and
“diversity within subordinated groups.”70 It is a masterful example of an early
work of anti-essentialist feminist scholarship.
In the intervening decades, intersectional feminism has migrated to the
mainstream, not so much as a distinct brand of feminism as a continuing call to
do feminism better, whichever brand or strand is in use.71 Martha’s work is part
of that dialogue, interrogating the subject of “women” and dwelling in the
intersections of lived experience that encompasses gender, race, sexuality, and
class. Which is not to say that feminist legal theory—neither Martha’s nor
anyone’s—has fully answered the call and can hang up the phone. The dialogue
continues, as does the critique.72 Martha’s work embraces that dialogue and is
enriched by it.
IV. GENDER IS CONSTRUCTED AND GENDER CONSTRUCTS
Gender is not merely the subject of law. Gender is constructed by law. And
in a dialectical turn, gender constructs law. Feminist scholars have long known
this, but it bears repeating: gender does not exist in nature, it is socially
constructed.
Gender not only takes its meaning from law, society, and culture, gender
also constructs the law and legal understandings. Put differently, gender
constructs the categories in which law traffics. In an enlightening examination
of this process, Martha, with feminist historian Linda Kerber, takes on tort law’s
evolving treatment of injuries purportedly stemming from “fright.”73 Their
69 Id. at 139.
70 Id. at 139, 142.
71 See CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 6–7,

407.

72 For a recent example of a popularized version of the critique, see generally RAFIA

ZAKARIA, AGAINST WHITE FEMINISM: NOTES ON DISRUPTION (2021). For a critique of this
critique, see Amber Husain, Against White Publishing: The Limitations of Rafia Zakaria’s
“Against White Feminism,” L.A. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 19, 2021), https://lareviewofbooks.org
/article/against-white-publishing-the-limits-of-rafia-zakarias-against-white-feminism/ [https://
perma.cc/E5A3-XMF8].
73 Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814 (1990) [hereinafter Chamallas & Kerber, Women,
Mothers, and the Law].
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article, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, traces the
progression of the common law of recovery for fright-based harm.74 Under the
traditional common law rule, recovery in damages for fright-based harm
required a showing of simultaneous physical impact.75 As the common law
evolved, it dropped the requirement of simultaneous impact, but still restricted
recovery to physical injuries.76 It finally arrived at a seemingly more liberal rule
that allowed recovery for emotional harm resulting from prior physical impact.77
This doctrinal evolution is typically taught without reference to gender, as the
product of greater scientific understanding of psychological harm and judges’
growing resistance to using the common law to subsidize corporate
wrongdoing.78 The conventional story posits a rationalizing process in which
law adapts to advancing scientific and societal understandings.79
Attention to gender tells a different story. Lost in the standard account is
that these claims for fright-based injuries were brought overwhelmingly by
women.80 As Martha and Linda Kerber explain, the paradigm cases are a
plaintiff who loses a pregnancy after a shock and a mother who sees her child
severely injured or killed.81 Tort law historically disfavored such claims by
categorizing the injuries as involving only emotional harm.82 This
categorization, while gender-neutral on the surface, functioned as a gatekeeper
for recovery that elevated the material interests of men (physical security and
property) over interests associated with women (emotional wellbeing and
relationships).83 Other tort doctrines reinforced this hierarchy, with judges
labeling fright-based harms unforeseeable, remote and unreasonable, and
regarding plaintiffs as mere bystanders.84 These doctrinal rules not only
reflected the prevailing views of women’s proper domestic role and unfitness
for the public realm, they reinforced this hierarchy.85 Denying women recovery
for pregnancy loss coincided with societal views about women’s unsuitability
for public life.86 Not coincidentally, the case law protected women from frightbased harms while in their homes, but ruled their losses unforeseeable if they
ventured into the world.87 Likewise, the common law viewed women’s claims
74 Id. at 814–15.
75 Id. at 819.
76 Id. at 820.
77 Id. at 820–21.
78 Id. at 823.
79 Chamallas & Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law, supra note 73, at 823.
80 Id. at 814–15.
81 Id. at 814.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 816, 838, 860.
85 Chamallas & Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law, supra note 73, at 816–17, 833.
86 Id. at 833.
87 Id. at 831–32 (“Inside the home, pregnancy and its dangers would be safeguarded

from external hazards, but a pregnant woman might be required to bear the risks of machines
and human negligence once she ventured outside.”).
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for emotional harm skeptically; hypersensitive (female) plaintiffs were required
to bear the risk of their oversensitivity.88
The linchpin of the story, as Martha and Linda Kerber reveal, is that the
modern shift in doctrine (allowing, for example, a mother to recover for
emotional harm resulting from witnessing the death of her child killed by a
negligent driver89) corresponds to changes in society’s understanding of
women’s roles as the earlier understandings were contested.90 The shift marked
a more expansive view of women’s legitimate claims to public life, even as it
held on to sentimentalized ideals of motherhood to support recovery for
emotional harms due to lost relationships with children.
In the article’s final analysis, gender—and not just a rationalizing process
of developing the common law—is revealed to be a key driver of doctrinal
change.91 The relationship between law, society, and gender runs deep, and is
marked by multiple reciprocal arrows of causality.
V. EVERYTHING OLD BECOMES NEW AGAIN
As the saying goes, “the more things change, the more they stay the same.”92
Like many feminist scholars and critical thinkers, Martha is wary of simplistic
narratives about progress and linearity.93 On closer inspection, what looks like
change on the surface often masks an underlying continuity. Even when law
reform efforts succeed, biased practices do not disappear; they may shift in
form, but likely linger.
This insight stands out in all of Martha’s work, but is particularly prescient
in her article setting out a theory of devaluation as a newer, under-theorized
form of bias.94 In the article, Martha shows how devaluation does much of the
same work of subordinating marginalized groups as the older explicit forms of
discrimination now prohibited by law.95 By taking a different form—
disadvantaging categories of activity associated with marginalized groups
(including women and people of color) instead of treating individual members
of these groups differently based on their group status—devaluation carries out
the agenda of disparate treatment but adapts to modern conditions so as to skate
88 Id. at 832–33 (explaining how the law reflected “the belief that only supersensitive

or abnormally delicate persons could suffer physical harms from fright”).
89 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968).
90 Chamallas & Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law, supra note 73, at 823.
91 Id. at 862–64.
92 Or in the original French version, “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” JEANBAPTISTE ALPHONSE KARR, 6 LES GUÊPES 278, 305 (Paris, Michael Lévy Frères 1862).
93 See, e.g., Chamallas & Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law, supra note 73, at 823
(rejecting the notion, common in contemporary torts textbooks, that the evolving doctrine of
fright-based injury has stemmed purely from sex-neutral factors like increased medical
understanding and waning corporate deference).
94 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, passim.
95 Id. at 752–55.
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under the law’s radar.96 Writing in 2001, Martha observed that public attitudes,
and with them law, had turned against outward, explicit manifestations of racial
and gender bias.97 Devaluation, on the other hand, lends itself to plausible
deniability, even though, as Martha shows, it is as pernicious a form of systemic
racial or gender bias as the old forms of discrimination now reachable by law.98
The law’s ambivalence toward working mothers is another example of the
stickiness of what underlies the old forms of bias in the wake of legal and social
change. Although employers may no longer openly target women’s wages with
a motherhood penalty, women who “choose” part-time work are still paid
disproportionately less for their work.99 Martha’s examination of the secondtier treatment of part-time workers—which she explains is a feminized category
due to women’s high representation in these jobs—exposes how change and
continuity coexist.100
The mid-1980s paired an overt acceptance of married women and mothers
in the workforce with lingering cultural resistance to mothers performing paid
work outside the home.101 Of course, this resistance to mothers working outside
the home was, and remains, racially specific.102 Poor women of color have been
expected to work, an expectation enforced by changes in welfare policy driven
by hostility toward Black mothers.103 How motherhood is valued is dependent
upon race, as reflected in the devaluation of Black motherhood and the judgment
(embedded in welfare policy) that Black mothers “have little positive to offer
their own children and . . . do not suffer as much as other women when forced
to separate from their children.”104 The women’s movement and civil rights
movement may have driven explicit expressions of these views underground,
but sexual and racial double-standards about mothers and work remain
influential.105
In the evolving cultural views on gender roles, white married women were
allowed to work but were expected to put their husbands’ careers first.106
96 Id. at 755–56.
97 Id. at 747–55.
98 Id. at 755–57.
99 Id. at 756–60.
100 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 711, 714–15.
101 Id. at 727–29.
102 CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 378.
103 Id. at 378–82.
104 Id. at 379 (citing Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 26 CONN.

L. REV. 871, 874 (1994)).
105 Id. at 379.
106 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 728. The choice to
capitalize “Black” but not “white” reflects the author’s understanding that the term “Black”
refers to a shared ethnic identity in a way that “white” does not, and that “it is a kind of
orthographic injustice to lowercase the B.” Mike Laws, Why We Capitalize ‘Black’ (and Not
‘White’), COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 16, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-bblack-styleguide.php [https://perma.cc/G9UR-7ZPB]. For an excellent explanation of why
the Columbia Journalism Review follows the same approach, see id.
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Likewise, white women could be regarded as good mothers while working, but
only if they subordinated their careers to family demands.107 Prioritizing their
own careers risked triggering the traps set for “career women”—the oftencaricatured villains in movies and popular culture.108 Such women typically get
their comeuppance by the movie’s end, and, once reformed, find happiness by
scaling back their careers and reconnecting with their families.109 For women
of color, there is little reverence for motherhood and subordinate wifely roles;
both their labor and motherhood are devalued, leaving them relegated to lowwage, low status jobs, and treated as unreliable, fungible workers.110 The law’s
neglect of these issues leaves these biases unchecked, as employment
discrimination law defers to employer prerogatives and refuses to intervene.
This neglect of part-time workers is part of a broader pattern of the law’s
continuation of second-tier status of working mothers, notwithstanding the
official story of legal change. While policies openly discriminating against
mothers in hiring and promotion are no longer lawful, more subtly biased
practices elude the law’s grasp.111 In a reference to the Supreme Court’s first
Title VII case, a challenge to the employer’s policy of refusing to hire women
with young children,112 Martha identifies “the ghost of Martin Marietta” in a
newer crop of cases alleging discrimination against mothers.113 With the shift
in cultural attitudes toward working mothers from explicit disapproval to
ambivalence, courts updated the conceptual tools they used to decide
discrimination cases brought by mothers.114 Writing shortly before “the
maternal wall” gained prominence in legal scholarship and advocacy,115 Martha
identified a judicial resistance to recognizing penalties against working mothers
as sex discrimination—a throwback to the “sex plus” reasoning that derailed
these cases in the lower courts before the Court’s decision in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.116 This newer resistance took the form of finding a genderneutral ruse to explain the motherhood penalty: a degendered sidelining of
107 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 728.
108 See Rebecca Deczynski, 16 Movies that Shed a Bad Light on Working Moms

(PHOTOS), CAFEMOM (Nov. 25, 2015), https://cafemom.com/entertainment/192961-16_
movies_that_shed_a [https://perma.cc/TN4F-AX34].
109 See id.
110 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 789–95.
111 Jean Lee, Discrimination Against Working Mothers Must End, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
31, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/discrimination-against-workingmothers-must-end [https://perma.cc/R4QX-3Y3L].
112 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
113 Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta,
44 VILL. L. REV. 337, 348 (1999) [hereinafter Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate
Treatment].
114 See id. at 351.
115 See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The Maternal Wall:
Research and Policy Perspectives on Discrimination Against Mothers, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 675
(2004).
116 Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment, supra note 113, at 342, 348.

2022]

THEORY MATTERS

449

“parents” whose responsibilities for children detract from their productivity at
work.117 With a blindness to the reality that fathers did not experience these
penalties, and that employers often relied on gendered assumptions about
working mothers as a group (rather than experiences with the individual
employee), courts attributed the negative treatment of plaintiffs to the “choice”
to become a parent.118 Hence, although Martin Marietta stands as precedent
against the overt adverse treatment of working mothers, Martha’s analysis
reveals how employers and courts adapted their practices to perpetuate the
biased treatment of mothers in the workplace.
The past nearly two years’ experience with COVID-19 reminds us just how
much remains fundamentally unchanged. Throughout the pandemic, women,
and women of color in particular, overwhelmingly bore the brunt of caretaking
of babies, toddlers, school-age children, elderly relatives and sick family
members, at the cost of a generation’s worth of progress in the labor force.119
Workers deemed essential—many of whom were women, especially those in
lower-paying jobs, and disproportionately women of color120—risked their own
health to go to work (unable to Zoom in from home) while simultaneously
confronting a “choice” between earning a living and caring for vulnerable
family members. The public health crisis squashed any rosy-eyed illusion of
workplace equality and illuminated the stark realities of double and triple
burdens imposed on working mothers. For those who have read Martha’s work,
it was clear that these inequities and compound burdens have been present all
along.
This insight, that the shiny new thing does not erase what came before,
applies to feminism itself. The “old” feminisms of the 1970s and 80s—liberal
feminism, dominance feminism, and cultural feminism—remain vibrant and
influential, even as newer feminisms gain ascendance. In one illustration of this
variation on the theme, Martha makes a persuasive case for resisting any
premature claims about the demise of liberal feminism.121 She uses the
celebrated Lilly Ledbetter case to argue that liberal feminism retains purchase
in confronting modern-day gender injustices.122 Although Ledbetter is
conventionally understood as involving a 1970s-style equal pay for equal work
claim, Martha points out that the case actually tells a more complicated feminist
117 Id. at 351.
118 Id. at 350 (quoting Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.

1997)).

119 Amanda Taub, Pandemic Will ‘Take Our Women 10 Years Back’ in the Workplace,

N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/world/covid-womenchildcare-equality.html [https://perma.cc/UNL3-E9F6].
120 Jocelyn Frye, On the Frontlines at Work and at Home: The Disproportionate
Economic Effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Women of Color, CNTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/frontlines-work-home/
[https://perma.cc/8UAW-9KZN].
121 Chamallas, Past as Prologue, supra note 15, at 161.
122 Id. at 159–61.
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story.123 Lilly Ledbetter’s experience involved not only being paid less than her
male counterparts to do the same work; she also experienced sexual harassment
by her boss, who assessed job performance and set pay raises, and she struggled
as a divorced mother in a company culture that was hostile to women.124 As
Martha explains, the case exposes structural inequality and hostile workplace
culture, in addition to pay discrimination.125 The legal claim itself may have
been narrow, but the case catalyzed a broader feminist movement to address
systemic bias and wage inequality, encompassing more substantive demands for
pay transparency and protections for union organizers.126
VI. NOTHING IS AS EASY AS IT SEEMS
For a critical theorist like Martha, simple narratives are suspect, as are
absolutes, dichotomies, and easy solutions. There is often more to the story, and
it is important to figure it out. Social facts are complex and like many social ills,
gender inequality defies a singular, easy fix. Martha’s work reflects a hard-won
skepticism of coherence in legal responses to complex human conduct and
relationships.
And so, in teasing out the implications of the egalitarian approach to law’s
regulation of sex, Martha cautions against imposing fixed views of the
possibilities for egalitarian relationships when it comes to asymmetrical
relationships at work and in educational settings.127 Finding the best (for now)
feminist sweet spot is historically contingent. Using an equality framework for
regulating sexual encounters means discerning the approach that “places women
at least disadvantage.”128 This requires grappling with the specificity of the now,
and an understanding of what has come before and is likely to continue or to
change.129 In terms of sexual equality, Martha opines, “[a]t this historical
period, the reservation of sex for intimacy and pleasure seems more likely to
empower women in sexual encounters than either the traditionalist insistence on
marriage or the permissive stance of the liberal.”130 But Martha counsels
continued attention to context and changing social facts.131 Striking a balance
between avoiding sexual coercion and encouraging opportunities for sexual
intimacy requires a subtle and contextual analysis; neither a blanket ban nor
wholesale approval of encounters where “consent” is present but power between
sexual partners is disparate, such as in supervisor-employee and professor-

123 Id. at 160–61.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 161.
127 Chamallas, Past as Prologue, supra note 15, at 172.
128 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 839.
129 See generally Chamallas, Past as Prologue, supra note 15.
130 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 839.
131 Id. at 843.
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student relationships.132 Despite intervening decades of fluctuation in the legal
and cultural responses to these controversies, Martha’s nuanced stance
continues to ask the right questions and emphasizes the importance of
continuing to ask them, with humility that the answers may change. Among the
“right questions” is not just the wellbeing of the sexual participants in isolation,
but the consequences to others.133
In addition to being skeptical of easy solutions, Martha casts a critical eye
on law’s success stories.134 Progress is not linear; law reform stumbles forward
in fits and starts, as the tensions underlying the doctrine ebb and flow. In an
early piece exploring this theme, Martha examines the controversy in disparate
impact doctrine over how parity in the employer’s “bottomline” affects the
legality of a particular employment practice that results in a disparate impact.135
When Martha was writing, the Supreme Court had just decided Connecticut v.
Teal,136 a case in which a standardized test for civil service promotions had a
disparate impact on the Black employees who took the test, even though the
ultimate promotion decisions had no such effect, likely due to the employer’s
affirmative action policy.137 Plaintiffs who failed the test brought a disparate
impact challenge, while the employer argued that the lack of impact at the
bottomline negated their claim.138 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,
sided with the plaintiffs.139 Although the opinion seems, at face value, to benefit
disparate impact plaintiffs, Martha reveals a more complicated picture.140
Beneath the doctrinal question of how to treat bottomline parity lies the
theoretical one of whether a group-based antisubordination principle or an
emphasis on individual opportunity should animate Title VII.141 The Court’s
opinion protected the individuals who were thwarted by the test, but at the
expense of a more far-reaching group-based vision of equal opportunity that
would prioritize ending systematic disparities.142 Understood in these terms,
Teal is not so much a victory for disparate impact plaintiffs as a step backward
from the group-based vision of equality at the heart of disparate impact claim,
and a precursor to the demise of affirmative action.

132 Id. at 854.
133 Cf. Amia Srinivasan, Opinion, What’s Wrong with Sex Between Professor and

Students? It’s Not What You Think, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/09/03/opinion/metoo-teachers-students-consent.html [https://perma.cc/HZ8D-XS2T]
(downplaying the significance of “consent” in such encounters and emphasizing the harm to
teaching and learning when professors have sex with students).
134 See generally, e.g., Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality, supra note 3.
135 Id.
136 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 440 (1982).
137 Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality, supra note 3, at 312.
138 Teal, 457 U.S. at 442.
139 Id.
140 Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality, supra note 3, at 313.
141 Id. at 314.
142 Id.
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Nearly three decades later, what alarmed Martha in the Court’s rejection of
the bottomline defense came home to roost when the Supreme Court in Ricci v.
Destefano143 elevated the disparate treatment theory and its individualistic,
colorblind understanding of equality over and above the race-conscious, groupbased disparate impact theory. In a disparate treatment challenge to the city of
New Haven’s action tossing out the results of firefighter promotion tests in order
to avoid a racially disparate impact, the Court in Ricci identified a “tension”
between disparate treatment and disparate impact doctrine.144 The Court
resolved that tension in favor of the disparate treatment claim and found that the
city engaged in unlawful disparate treatment.145 Going further, Justice Scalia in
a concurring opinion even suggested that the disparate impact claim itself may
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.146 The ultimate fate of
the disparate impact theory remains to be seen, but it appears to stand on
increasingly precarious legs. Rereading Martha’s article in light of these
subsequent developments reveals the role that the Teal case, a sheep in wolf’s
clothing, played in charting that trajectory.
Starkly presented dichotomies are also ripe for Martha’s picking. Of the
many dichotomies animating law, none has been more problematic for gender
equality than the premise of a sharp distinction between the public and private
spheres. Relegated to the private sphere, women have historically been excluded
from the public sphere of the market.147 Work inside the home is privatized
(unpaid, unprotected), while paid work outside the home is the subject of legal
regulation. The split reinforces not just separation but the social and economic
inferiority of women. Much of Martha’s employment discrimination
scholarship sounds this theme, including her examination of the predicament
facing part-time workers.148 Terminology is important. In the professions, parttime work is referred to as “the mommy track.”149 No one speaks of a working
father; he is called an employee.150 The stark separation of the private (domestic
responsibilities) from the public (market work) props up the inadequate legal
protections for the part-time work force and the utter invisibility of law’s
wholesale neglect of domestic (unpaid) labor.
Dichotomous representations are ever-present where law, culture, and
gender intersect, and no more so than in the treatment of rape. Martha takes up
several such dichotomies in an essay she published in 2005 discussing Alice

143 Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557, 558 (2009).
144 Id. at 582.
145 Id. at 583.
146 Id. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147 Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment, supra note 113, at 348.
148 See generally Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3.
149 Tamar Lewin, ‘Mommy Career Track’ Sets Off a Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1989,

at A18.

150 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 726.
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Sebold’s memoir, Lucky.151 As first drafted, my Festschrift contribution
discussed Martha’s analysis of Lucky for its unraveling of the tangled
dichotomies that still influence the legal system’s response to rape. But as this
Festschrift issue was working its way through the editorial process, a shattering
revelation came to light that fundamentally changes everything about the Lucky
memoir and any discussion of it. The man convicted in 1982 of raping Sebold
when she was a freshman at Syracuse University, Anthony Broadwater, was
exonerated after serving sixteen years in prison and twenty-three years on
probation as a sex offender.152 It is now clear that Sebold’s status as a white
woman and Broadwater’s identity as a Black man fundamentally worked a grave
injustice far different than the injustice Sebold wrote about in her memoir.153
Although the facts of the rape itself and the resulting harm Sebold experienced
remain, Sebold accused the wrong man and the legal system convicted him.
Tragically, even after Sebold identified another man in the police lineup, the
prosecutor and judge continued to believe Sebold’s insistence that Broadwater
was the rapist.154 Sebold’s testimony at trial that it was Broadwater, despite her
having pointed to a different man in the police lineup, plus a hair analysis based
on junk science were the only pieces of evidence purporting to link Broadwater
151 See generally Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441 (2005) (a

narrative analysis of ALICE SEBOLD, LUCKY (1999)) [hereinafter Chamallas, Lucky].
152 Douglass Dowty & Tim Knauss, Alice Sebold Case: How Race and Incompetence
Doomed Anthony Broadwater to Prison, SYRACUSE (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.syracuse.com
/news/2022/01/alice-sebold-case-how-race-and-incompetence-doomed-anthony-broadwaterto-prison.html [https://perma.cc/9DJU-BBRK]; Karen Zraick & Alexandra Alter, Man Is
Exonerated in Rape Case Described in Alice Sebold’s Memoir, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/23/nyregion/anthony-broadwater-alice-sebold.html [https://
perma.cc/D2V3-AAXD]; see also Johanna Berkman, Why Didn’t More of Us Question Alice
Sebold’s Memoir, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/12/questioningalice-sebold-memoir-lucky.html (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
153 Sebold issued a public apology to Broadwater, expressing regret for having
“unwittingly” played a role in “a system that sent an innocent man to jail,” and in a
remarkable statement, Broadwater accepted Sebold’s apology, saying “it’s a strong thing for
her to do, understanding that she was a victim and I was a victim too.” See Alexandra Alter
& Karen Zraick, Alice Sebold Apologizes to Man Wrongly Convicted of Raping Her, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/nyregion/alice-sebold-rapecase.html [https://perma.cc/Q5DX-QHMS] [hereinafter Alter & Zraick, Alice Sebold
Apologizes]. Anthony Broadwater is now suing the State of New York for $50 million. Man
Cleared in Author’s 1981 Rape Sues NY Over Conviction, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25.
2022), https://apnews.com/article/new-york-lawsuits-syracuse-nyc-state-wire-alice-sebold3e82cf299b7fea59a4e903392ef57cd0 (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
154 Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152. Even at that time, eyewitness identification was
known to be highly fallible, and especially so for cross-racial identification. Id. In light of
the large numbers of convictions that have been overturned based on false eyewitness
accounts, it is logical to assume that many cases resulting in convictions in prior decades
were tainted by false identifications. E.g., id. (“Mistaken eyewitness identifications
contributed to 69% of more than 375 wrongful convictions in the United States overturned
by DNA evidence since 1992, according to the Innocence Project.”).
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to the crime.155 It took a movie producer working on a film version of Lucky
decades after the memoir’s publication to raise questions about Broadwater’s
guilt.156 His persistence in pursuing these questions set in motion a process that
eventually exonerated Broadwater nearly forty years after his wrongful
conviction.157
In light of this stunning development, it is impossible to discuss Lucky, or
any analysis of it, without reckoning with the centrality of race—race privilege
as well as race bias—and how it distorted the criminal legal system’s response
to Sebold’s rape. Sebold’s memoir did not ignore race, but its account failed
spectacularly in missing the deep truths about how race drove the trajectory of
the criminal proceedings. Sebold acknowledged the existence of systemic
racism and the long history of Black men wrongly convicted for sexually
assaulting white women.158 But Sebold’s writing about her angst over her initial
failure to identify Broadwater in the lineup,159 and the defense attorney’s
highlighting of Broadwater’s race to call into question the accuracy of crossracial identification,160 are particularly painful to reread. Sebold portrayed as
unfair the defense lawyer’s questioning of her credibility in identifying
Broadwater at trial merely because she made a mistake in the lineup.161 In its
final analysis, Sebold’s account of how race infected the proceeding came down
to her expressing a wish that her rapist had been white, as if Broadwater’s race
was a complication or inconvenience that would have been better for her to
avoid.162 That Sebold, a self-styled liberal sympathetic to racial inequality,163
viewed this as an example of how the racial dynamics at trial harmed her
credulity, shows both the depths of systemic racism toward Black defendants
and the utter inadequacy of white liberal perspectives to come to grips with the
full measure of racism’s distortion of criminal justice.
In a 2017 “afterward” to her memoir, Sebold returned to the racial inequities
as she then-understood them to have affected the case.164 She wrote, “My rapist
155 See Douglass Dowty, 40-Year-Old Syracuse Rape Conviction at the Heart of Author
Alice Sebold’s Memoir Is Thrown Out, SYRACUSE (Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.syracuse.com
/news/2021/11/40-year-old-syracuse-rape-conviction-at-the-heart-of-author-alice-seboldsmemoir-is-thrown-out.html [https://perma.cc/2LC3-E25X]; Alter & Zraick, Alice Sebold
Apologizes, supra note 153.
156 Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152.
157 Dowty, supra note 155; Alter & Zraick, Alice Sebold Apologizes, supra note 153.
158 Sarah Weinman, Rereading Alice Sebold’s Lucky, ELLE (Dec. 6, 2021), https://
www.elle.com/culture/books/a38425267/rereading-alice-sebolds-lucky/ [https://perma.cc
/LD7H-6TR6].
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Berkman, supra note 152.
162 Weinman, supra note 158.
163 Alice Sebold, Statement from Alice Sebold, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2021), https://
medium.com/@Alice_Sebold/statement-from-alice-sebold-c109361d6150 (on file with the
Ohio State Law Journal).
164 Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152.
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was poor, black, and uneducated, and came from a family with an entrenched
criminal record. I was a middle-class white girl attending an expensive
university. . . . I knew that my words mattered.”165 Sebold’s point in
acknowledging these disparities was not to reconsider whether Broadwater
might have been railroaded into a wrongful conviction, but to highlight the
greater difficulty a woman with less privilege would have faced in having her
story believed. The latter point is well-grounded.166 But, the acknowledgement
of Broadwater’s lack of privilege lands entirely differently now that we see his
innocence and realize that Sebold’s privilege was powerful enough to condemn
a Black man to a lengthy prison term for a crime he did not commit.
This is not to say that gender bias did not also influence the legal system’s
response to the rape, and in ways that map onto how it has historically
discredited rape victims. The initial law enforcement response was to question
whether Sebold had been raped at all, despite her physical injuries, immediate
police report, and distraught presentation167—all indicia of the biased
prototypes used to distinguish “real” rape from bad sex or exaggerated
claims.168 These tropes map onto stereotypes used to differentiate good girls and
real victims (Sebold’s status as a virgin was repeatedly mentioned at trial as a
reason to believe her and take the harm seriously169) from women who deserve
what they get.170 Race and class fundamentally affect how these lines are drawn
and which women are entitled to the law’s protection.171 The title of the memoir
refers to the many times Sebold was told she was “lucky” to signify that she met
the criteria for a real rape and was deserving of justice: she was a virgin, was
raped by a stranger, and had physical injuries that were sufficient to corroborate
a crime, but not as bad as they might have been.172 Of course, crucially, she was
also white. These aspects of the rape likely overcame law enforcement’s initial
skepticism of Sebold’s report of the rape.173 It is no small irony—indeed,
“irony” does not begin to capture it—that in Sebold’s encounters with law
enforcement she was closely scrutinized for her account of whether she was
raped but uncritically and unequivocally believed when she pointed to a Black
man as her rapist.
Martha’s critical examination of the Lucky narrative was written nearly two
decades before Broadwater’s exoneration,174 and the implications of this grave
165 Id.
166 See CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 299.
167 See Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152.
168 For a discussion of rape protoypes, see CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST

LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 296–98.
169 Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152.
170 Id.; CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 296–
303.
171 CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 7.
172 Chamallas, Lucky, supra note 151, at 442.
173 Dowty & Knauss, supra note 152.
174 Chamallas, Lucky, supra note 151, at 443.
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injustice will continue to reverberate as legal scholars and close observers of the
criminal law’s engagement with race and rape draw lessons from what
happened. And yet, the questions Martha explored in her essay remain vital ones
in theorizing about rape. One such question that has concerned feminist theorists
and criminal law scholars is whether rape is fundamentally a crime of sex or of
violence.175 The question matters because the understanding of the harm of rape,
as either the absence of consent to sex or as sexualized violence, shapes the
law’s response.176 The two ways of understanding rape are often presented as
alternatives, but Martha’s analysis reveals this to be a false dichotomy; it can be
both.177 And the tilt toward one or the other may be more particular than
universal.178 For Sebold—who did experience a brutal and devastating rape,
although not by Broadwater—the act of sexual penetration was not the defining
harm, despite the criminal law’s singular insistence on this point of contact as
an element of the crime.179 As Martha’s analysis explains, a violent nonsexual
assault would not have produced the same harm.180 The harm of rape is
attributable to neither sex nor violence alone; it is the intertwining of the two
that makes rape a distinctive crime with a distinctive harm.181 It is that
complexity that law and culture must grapple with in order to fully understand
and address the harm of rape.
In the years since Martha wrote this essay, there has been more pushback to
“trauma” discourse and controversy within critical theory circles about how to
characterize the harm of sexual violence.182 Martha’s analysis still speaks to
these flashpoints in culture and critical theory, as she persuasively explains that
a major part of the harm of rape stems from the cultural and social
misunderstanding of the survivor’s experience.183
The effect of cultural representations of rape and social reactions to
survivors was more recently the subject of a critically acclaimed HBO series, “I
May Destroy You.”184 In this contemporary drama the lead character is a Black
British woman struggling to piece together and come to terms with her rape,
which is clouded by her impaired memory (her rapist, whose identity she does
not learn until the end of the series, drugged her).185 The protagonist experiences
175 Id. at 444.
176 See id. at 461.
177 Id. at 461–67.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Chamallas, Lucky, supra note 151, at 467.
181 Id. at 469.
182 See generally Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion

Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010) (blaming the rise of the abortion regret thesis
on the dominance of trauma as the lens for understanding women’s harms from sexual
violence).
183 Chamallas, Lucky, supra note 151, at 463–64.
184 I May Destroy You (HBO 2020).
185 Id.; E. Alex Jung, Michaela the Destroyer: How a Young Talent from East London
Went from Open-Mic Nights to Making the Most Sublimely Unsettling Show of the Year,
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profound alienation in the course of processing what happened and emerges
with a changed understanding of herself and her relationships.186 As in Lucky,
neither the sexual nor the violent dimension of the attack singularly captures the
harm. But unlike Lucky, the series narrative stays focused on the interaction of
harm and identity and eschews vindication in the criminal justice system for a
postmodern ending of differently imagined scenarios and their relationship to
healing.187
Even with a better understanding of the harms of rape, the role of criminal
law in pursuing justice for rape victims remains a site of controversy. Critical
legal theorists, including Martha, have long recognized that calling on the state
to address gendered harm is fraught with peril.188 It remains vital for law to
recognize and respond to the complex harms of rape, and Martha’s analysis
stands as an insightful, nuanced account of those harms. But the unraveling of
the criminal case against Sebold’s alleged rapist now adds to the known racial
injustices in law enforcement that demand not mere “reform” but a deep and
unvarnished reckoning.
VII. GENDER HIDES IN PLAIN SIGHT
Gender is ubiquitous; if you don’t see it, dig deeper. All of Martha’s
scholarship probes the places where gender lurks, so I will limit my discussion
to just a few examples. To be sure, the regulation of sexuality wears only a thin
veneer of neutrality masking gendered double standards. This is no revelation
to anyone who has studied sexuality, but Martha’s analysis of the layers of
gender goes deeper than most. For example, she observes, the traditional
approach to regulating sex based on status superficially required all persons to
refrain from nonmarital sex, but the subordinate position of wives (socially and
economically) and the cultural double-standard of sexual morality made this
supposed gender neutrality more farce than reality.189 Less obvious, Martha
explains, is that the liberal approach is just as gendered.190 Even though consent
held a marginally more plausible claim to gender-neutrality, it masks the
physical and social inequality in male-female relationships that situate men as
sexual initiators and women as passive participants.191 Liberalism’s shroud of

VULTURE (July 6, 2020), https://www.vulture.com/article/michaela-coel-i-may-destroyyou.html (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
186 I May Destroy You, supra note 184.
187 Jung, supra note 185 (spoilers included).
188 See CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra at 2, at 306–09,
406, 409. See generally Angela Y. Davis, Rape, Racism, and the Capitalist Setting, 9 BLACK
SCHOLAR 24 (1978); Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1983).
189 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 788.
190 Id. at 796.
191 Id. at 814.
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consent protected sexual exploitation by making it less visible and therefore a
less likely target of law reform.192
Once you start seeing gender in formally neutral rules and practices, you
find it permeates legal and social structures. In the mid-1980s very few people
viewed the precariousness of part-time work as a gender issue.193 But Martha
showed how the gender composition of the group, part-time workers being
predominantly female, drove pay disparities between the part-time and full-time
workforce.194 These disparities are not explained by differences in the number
of hours worked or other gender-neutral factors.195 Likewise, superficially
gender-neutral rules regulating workers in predominantly female jobs are
fashioned to correspond to the gender composition of the group.196 Such rules
take the form of low-pay, no benefits, and regimented treatment.197 That these
rules also apply to the few men working in female-dominated jobs does not
make them gender-neutral in anything but form.
These examples support a point Martha has developed in much of her
scholarship, that the gender composition of a group triggers cognitive bias and
schemas according to stereotypes about the group.198 For part-time work, the
gendered meaning is not just that part-time workers are mostly women, but that
full-time work is incompatible with the demands of families and parenting
disproportionally borne by women.199 The association between part-time work
and working mothers defines the category of part-time work in the public
consciousness and employer policies. A similar gender association underlies the
low value placed on domestic carework and housework.200 The formal
neutrality of the category lends a plausible deniability to charges of gender bias.
The urge to deny the role of gender in the unfair treatment of a formally
gender-neutral category is aided by constitutional law’s emphasis on sex and
race classifications as the sine qua non of discrimination.201 As with the refrain
that the presence of some white persons in a disfavored category consisting
mostly of people of color refutes a claim of race discrimination, the scattering
of men among a group comprised mostly of women serves to redirect attention
away from gender. As social psychologists have shown, calling out race and
gender bias is unpopular because it upends deep seated cultural beliefs in a “just
192 Id. at 796.
193 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 724–25 (noting that part-

time work and the treatment of part-time workers was not a major subject of attention in the
feminist movement, partly due to ambivalence about accentuating women’s differences in
employment).
194 Id. at 725–31.
195 Id. at 741.
196 Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum,” supra note 3, at 4.
197 Id. at 29.
198 See generally, e.g., id.; Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3.
199 See Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum,” supra note 3, at 10 n.46.
200 Id. at 26–27.
201 See id. at 5–22 (noting how case law regarding disparate treatment has emphasized
sex and race classifications).
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world.”202 Martha’s analysis pushes back against this resistance, explaining why
the inclusion of some men in a second-class category does not cleanse it of
gender.203 The fact that some men are part-time workers, for example, does not
interrupt the feminization of the category, nor its association with women and
the mommy track; instead, the few men in the category are feminized and
harmed as a result.204 Of course, the position that men can be harmed by sex
discrimination was staked out much earlier, in the 1970s by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s iconic litigation strategy.205 But long after equal protection has all
but ridden the law of sex-based classifications, the feminization of certain
categories associated with women continues to disadvantage the many women
and few men belonging to them.
VIII. IT’S THE INSTITUTION, STUPID!206
Institutions shape law and law shapes institutions. Change does not occur
from law reform alone; institutions carry out, respond to, and subvert legal
mandates. Institutional practices, cultures and structures must be understood and
addressed for law to matter.
This insight, which pervades Martha’s work and is a core premise of the law
and society school of scholarship, is summed up nicely in her article on sex and
consent: “Whatever the law’s language, its utility to women is likely to depend
heavily on the presence of institutions responsive to women that exert pressure
on the law.”207 Hence, changes to the legal definition of consent would have
mattered little without the creation of rape crisis centers, battered women’s
shelters, and trainings for law enforcement and social service providers.208
The theme of the importance of institutions is central to Martha’s
scholarship. In an essay reflecting on the legacy of Fifth Circuit Judge Alvin
Rubin, Martha brings this insight to bear on her analysis of the judge’s
employment discrimination opinions.209 In two opinions dissenting from
decisions in favor of the employer, Judge Rubin found systemic discrimination
responsible for continuing patterns of occupational segregation.210 Martha’s
analysis of these cases demonstrates the importance of dismantling the veneers
202 See, e.g., Katie Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of
Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1303–07 (2012).
203 See, e.g., Chamallas, Exploring the “Entire Spectrum,” supra note 3, at 46–48.
204 See Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 730.
205 See generally Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
206 Those of a certain age will recognize the reference to James Carville’s reminder to
Democrats during the Clinton Administration, “It’s the economy, stupid!” (circa 1992).
207 Chamallas, Consent, supra note 16, at 815.
208 Id.
209 See generally Martha Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination: A
Rubin Trilogy on Title VII, 52 LA. L. REV. 1457 (1992) [hereinafter Chamallas, Racial
Segregation and Cultural Domination].
210 See generally Hill v. Miss. State Emp. Serv., 918 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1990); EEOC
v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
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of “choice” and custom masquerading as business need and foregrounds the
institutional practices responsible for these patterns.
In one of these cases, the employer, a hotel, relegated African Americans to
low-paying, low-skill service jobs, mirroring patterns of racial segregation in
the hospitality industry.211 While the majority attributed this disparity to
employee choice, Judge Rubin dissented, connecting the dots between the
hotel’s historic and continuing patterns of racial segregation and its intent to
discriminate.212 Martha’s discussion of the practices behind this segregation
sheds light on the importance of an institutional analysis. She points out that the
hotel’s process for filling jobs was designed in a way likely to entrench the racial
status quo.213 Rather than posting openings, potential applicants learned of
opportunities by word of mouth.214 Then, the hotel’s white supervisors filled
openings based on their subjective discretion.215 Written forms completed by
applicants were placed into folders according to the applicant’s specified “first
choice” of position—which was often steered by the interviewer to conform to
the hotel’s racial hiring patterns.216 If the applicant did not list a first choice and
expressed a willingness to take any position, their application was placed in an
“anything” folder.217 Unbeknownst to the applicants who expressed this
preference (likely those most eager for a job), the “anything” folder was never
considered when the hotel managers filled open positions.218 Pointing to these
practices, Martha shows how applicant “choice” is institutionally
constructed.219 While the panel majority saw the racial hiring pattern as a
product of African American applicants preferring the jobs for which they were
hired,220 attention to the institution’s active role in constructing applicant
preference reveals a different picture of the hotel’s responsibility, one in which
the “folder system” is not a benign custom after all.221
211 Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d at 101–02. The hotel hired African Americans to work

in the kitchen, housecleaning, and bellhop areas, while hiring white employees in the
customer-facing jobs of front desk, bartender, and cocktail waitress; higher-skill positions
such as accountants, sales, security and skilled maintenance were also filled by white
employees. Id. at 105–06 n.11 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 106.
213 Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination, supra note 209, at 1460–
61.
214 Id. at 1460.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1460–61.
217 Id. at 1460.
218 Id. at 1461.
219 Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination, supra note 209, at 1461.
220 Id.
221 Martha likewise singles out appreciation for institutional context—and specifically
the realities of pay practices in obstructing employee knowledge—as the highlight of Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S.
618, 643–61 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equity
and Institutional Context, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1046–48 (2009) (explaining Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent as tracking the institutional account of pay discrimination and rejecting
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Martha does not let Judge Rubin off the hook when he fails to hone in on
the institutional dynamics behind racial hierarchy in workplace culture.222 In a
now-notorious decision, Judge Rubin authored the court’s opinion in Garcia v.
Gloor,223 upholding a lumber supply company’s strict English-only policy
without requiring any showing of business necessity. Observing that the rule did
not operate to exclude Latinx employees, since the majority of the company’s
positions were filled by Spanish-speaking employees, Judge Rubin reasoned
that the plaintiff and other bilingual employees could have avoided any disparate
impact by refraining from speaking Spanish at work.224 Martha’s critique
elaborates her theory of cultural domination as a form of discrimination.225
Judge Rubin’s “mutable condition” exception to disparate impact doctrine226—
giving employers a pass when the protected class could choose to avoid the
impact—is predicated on a false understanding of Title VII’s protected classes
(race, national origin and sex) as fixed and unchanging, restricting protection to
only immutable conditions.227
In contrast, Martha’s analysis centers the cultural meaning of the noSpanish rule, made visible only when understood in the context of the
institutional culture of the workplace.228 As Martha explains, the English-only
rule functioned as a “cultural marker” for the employer to position itself as “an
Anglo business” in spite of the Latinx composition of its workforce.229 Far from
white-washing the English-only rule, the predominantly Latinx composition of
the workforce helps explain why the English-only rule is discriminatory.230
Drawing on feminist philosopher Iris Marion Young’s work on oppression,
which connects segregation to the culture that sustains it, Martha highlights the
importance of cultural domination as an institutional practice linked to
embedded patterns of racial segregation.231 This lens enables her to explain in
compelling terms how Judge Rubin’s opinion rested on an essentialist and
problematic understanding of Title VII’s protected classes.232 In Martha’s
account, it is the social meaning of the protected class—how others perceive

the neoclassical understanding of employers as passive price-takers in the market when they
set employee wages).
222 Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination, supra note 209, at 1457.
223 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980).
224 Id. at 272.
225 Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination, supra note 209, at 1475–
76.
226 Id. at 1471–75.
227 Id. at 1473–74.
228 Id. at 1474.
229 Id. at 1475.
230 Id. at 1473.
231 Chamallas, Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination, supra note 209, at 1478
(citing IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 49–59 (1990)).
232 Id. at 1478–79.
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and respond to people based on their identity—that matters most for properly
interpreting the civil rights laws.233
The institutional account can also help judges select from competing expert
testimony and social science research in discrimination cases. In her analysis of
the controversy over the proper perspective to use in gauging the severity of
harassment—the reasonable woman versus the reasonable person standard—
Martha argues against merely searching for the “best” social science research to
inform judges’ decisions.234 She begins by pointing out that, like law, the social
sciences have marginalized feminist accounts and women’s perspectives, and
notes the dangers of a “neutral” approach that masks implicit biases in favor of
majority (white, male) perspectives.235 Instead, she urges judges to draw on the
disciplines and research that foreground the role of institutions, particularly
organizational structure and culture, to inform their decisions.236 In sexual
harassment cases, for example, she notes the relevance of research by scholars
such as Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist whose institutional perspective
explains how harassment undermines women’s opportunities for
advancement.237 Without understanding how organizational culture and
structure shape women’s responses to harassment, courts run the risk of
trivializing these harms. Focusing on the institutional structure and culture in
which harassment occurs can also help judges avoid falling into the trap of
essentializing women and their experiences of harassment. As Martha explains,
although some (perhaps many) women are not offended by exposure to sexually
explicit material outside of work, the same material in a workplace context in
which women are marginalized has very different consequences for women’s
careers.238
IX. MIND THE GAP
Often, what matters most falls into the gaps between categories. It is in law’s
silences and open spaces that the gems can be found. Categories are entrenched
in law and endemic to legal reasoning, but what they leave out can be just as
important and illuminating as what they capture, if not more so.
So it is with what Martha theorizes as devaluation, a type of bias that flies
under the radar of the legally recognized categories of discrimination, disparate
treatment and disparate impact.239 By exploring what is left out of the main
doctrinal categories, Martha observes that many gender-linked harms—for
233 Id. at 1474–79.
234 Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 56, at 114.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 115.
237 Id.; see also Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89, 107 (1990) (explaining how insights from social
psychology can illuminate the institutional practices likely to lead to bias in organizations).
238 Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 56, at 116.
239 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 755–56.
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example, rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, household labor,
occupational segregation, abortion, and welfare reform—occur in single-gender
settings and environments, and are thus impervious to discrimination law’s
comparative framework.240 Women and the injuries they experience are
devalued precisely because of their distance from men’s interests, which are
more highly valued.241 With devaluation, bias is directed toward women, people
of color, and other subordinated groups, but without demonstrable intentional
discrimination targeting individual members of the group for different
treatment.242
The depression of wages in women-dominated occupations is a leading
example. While courts have resisted recognizing a cause of action for such
bias—often termed “comparable worth”—Martha shows that when jobs become
gendered female, stereotypes result in depressed wages.243 Because it is the
category of jobs that is targeted for biased treatment, and not women as a class
or individual women, the law does not recognize it as discrimination.244 Not
limited to gender, devaluation is also a tool of racial subordination.245 Writing
decades before the Black Lives Matter movement brought the devaluation of
African American lives to the forefront of public consciousness, Martha
critiqued constitutional law’s failure to remedy the devaluation of African
American lives in the administration of the death penalty.246 Even though
defendants charged with killing white victims were shown to be more than four
times as likely to receive the death penalty than defendants charged with killing
Black victims,247 the Supreme Court famously upheld the constitutionality of
the administration of the death penalty against an equal protection challenge.248
Despite the clear devaluation of Black victims, the pattern of bias did not match
up to what the Court requires for an equal protection violation: intentionally
different treatment of individual defendants based on race.249
In her elaboration of devaluation, Martha laid the groundwork for stretching
the existing categories to better address this pervasive and heretofore under240 Id. at 753–56.
241 See id. at 757–58.
242 See id. at 772–77.
243 See id. at 765–67.
244 Id. at 771.
245 See Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 760–

61.

246 Id. at 760–64.
247 Id. at 760 (citing DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI,

JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990)).
A recent follow-up study examining the data on persons actually put to death (not just
sentenced) found that the execution rate for defendants convicted of killing white victims
was seventeen times greater than that for defendants convicted of killing Black victims. See
Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 585, 587
(2020).
248 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
249 Id.
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theorized form of bias.250 One way she did this was by sketching the similarities
between devaluation and discrimination, as conventionally defined.251 Her key
insight is that the Ruth Bader Ginsburg-litigated constitutional law precedents
striking down sex-based classifications that treat men as breadwinners and
women as homemakers actually reflect an implicit recognition of the harm of
devaluation.252 Martha shows that, although these cases involved a quasisuspect sex-based classification, the only way to understand them is through the
lens of devaluation.253 Otherwise, cases involving men who were denied the
same spousal benefits that wives received through their husbands’ labor force
participation would involve discrimination only against men. But at the time
these now-classic cases were decided, the case for heightened scrutiny for
discrimination against men lacked a doctrinal foundation and would not likely
have appealed to the Court.254 Only by understanding that these classifications
worked a devaluation of women as wage-earners could the Court appreciate the
invidiousness of the harm.255 In addition, Martha points out, although
devaluation does not involve the different treatment of individuals along suspect
lines, it is, at its core, comparative.256 The ultimate inquiry is not unlike that of
disparate treatment: whether the treatment of the group (women, for disparate
treatment; persons within categories associated with women, for devaluation)
would have been better had there been no cognitive association with women.257
Although recognizing devaluation as a legal wrong is still some distance from
disparate treatment’s anti-classification, individualistic model, Martha
persuasively situates it as more of a modification than a radical departure.258
These insights likely will not sway the present Supreme Court to embrace
devaluation as an actionable wrong, but Martha’s analysis lays the groundwork
for future steps in that direction. Admittedly, in some respects, recent
developments have made this hope appear even more unrealistic. The Court’s
elevation of disparate treatment above disparate impact in Ricci, discussed
above, surely signals a hostility to moving from individualistic to more groupconscious approaches to discrimination.259 But looking elsewhere in the
intervening case law reveals some shred of hope, even if flickering. In the
pathbreaking pregnancy discrimination case, Young v. United Postal Service,
Inc.,260 the Court broke free from the constraints of the disparate treatment and
disparate impact categories, as traditionally defined, to embrace a claim for bias
250 See generally Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7.
251 See id. at 753–55.
252 See id. at 756–59.
253 Id. at 757.
254 Id.
255 See id. at 758.
256 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 775–76.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.
260 See generally Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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that looks very much like devaluation.261 The Court’s holding embraces a
discrimination claim for devaluing pregnant women in the calculation of
whether to accommodate their pregnancy-related conditions by offering light
duty work.262 While the Court never used the word “devaluation,” its approach
to pregnancy discrimination maps onto Martha’s theory of devaluation quite
nicely. While the Court purports to limit its novel approach to pregnancy
discrimination only, new legal theories cannot always be cabined.263
This optimistic note leads me to my last (substantive) takeaway from
Martha’s scholarship.
X. TAKE THE LONG VIEW
Martha began publishing in the early 1980s, well after the heyday of
Warren-style judicial activism264 and at a time when Reagan appointees were
populating a more conservative federal bench.265 Since then, the rightward shift
of the federal courts has only intensified, and particularly so on the Supreme
Court, with the passing of Justice Ginsburg.266 But far from losing hope,
rereading Martha’s scholarship left me recommitted to the importance of
bringing feminist theory and feminist insights to bear on law. Martha’s
imaginative reconstructions of doctrine and legal theory dwell in hope and
possibility.
Martha has a keen eye for finding the cracks in the patriarchy and the legal
system that supports it—cracks that let in glimpses of light that, with the right
pressure points, may someday widen into a fracture. In her article on
devaluation, she counters the anticipated objection that her theory is
“impractical” with the observation that the discriminatory intent requirement for
disparate treatment (both statutory and constitutional) has long been shifting and
contested, and points out the openings (for example, where the law has already
moved to recognize causation as a stand-in for intent) for moving the needle.267
Even when Martha’s proposed rethinking of legal theory is far afield from
existing law, she lights a path toward change. Martha acknowledges, for
example, that the form of bias she calls “biased prototypes” is not addressed by
261 Id. at 1354–55.
262 Id. at 1347.
263 Cf. Chamallas, Past as Prologue, supra note 15, at 161 (“[T]here are some claims

for equality that, once unleashed, cannot easily be contained.”).
264 Daniel Frost, Judicial Excellence After Earl Warren, JUDICATURE, Spring 2017, at
57, 58.
265 Graeme Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in His Own Image, 71 ABA J.
60, 60 (1985).
266 Shannon Larson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Died a Year Ago. Here Are Four Ways Her
Death Has Already Reshaped the Supreme Court, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 23, 2021), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2021/09/23/nation/ruth-bader-ginsburg-died-year-ago-here-are-fourways-her-death-has-already-reshaped-supreme-court/ (on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal).
267 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 753–54.
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discrimination law, nor likely to be so in the future.268 She demonstrates,
nonetheless, that perceptions of injury are circumscribed by cognitive bias that
centers a presumptively “representative” image, often in ways that compound
disadvantage to women and people of color.269
Martha’s analysis identifies three features of biased prototypes.270 First,
although they loom large in the cultural imagination, they are not actually
representative.271 Most rapes are not stranger rape,272 most rapists are not Black
men,273 and most rapes are intraracial, not interracial.274 And yet, the prototype
of a “real” rape is a Black man raping a white woman who is a stranger.275
Second, biased prototypes contain a false theory about causation of harm: they
point to the character of the individuals involved, rather than the social situation,
as the root cause.276 Third, they trade in harmful dualisms and false dichotomies,
reinforcing sharply differentiated categories,277 such as stranger/acquaintance,
chaste/promiscuous, and race/gender.
Unlike devaluation, the harm of biased prototypes is noncomparative, and
thus falls farther from the core of discrimination law.278 Identifying bias in a
prototype does not mean, for example, that a female rape victim would be
treated better if she were male, or that a mother who receives welfare would be
less culturally tarnished if she were a father on welfare. Rather, Martha’s point
is that cultural scripts about rape victims and welfare mothers drain empathy,
obscure injury, and deny redress in law and social policy.279 Although the harm
is not comparative, Martha points out that this form of cognitive bias is
nonetheless harmful in ways that align with gender and racial subordination.280
The prototype of “real rape,” for example, reinscribes sexist and racist scripts.281
Martha is not optimistic about the capacity of discrimination law to expand
to capture this harm.282 She counsels that a more robust set of legal rights is not
always the answer to subordination,283 and reminds us that feminism has a
complicated relationship to law reform.284 And yet, far from rendering her
analysis futile, this insight points the way to a different strategy for change, one
268 Id. at 803.
269 Id. at 779–80.
270 Id. at 780–82.
271 Id at 780–81.
272 Id. at 783.
273 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 784.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 781–82.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 803.
279 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 786–95.
280 Id. at 783–84.
281 Id. at 786–89.
282 Id. at 789.
283 Id. at 795–98.
284 Id. at 798.
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of pushing back on the narratives that support biased prototypes. Martha
concludes with a call “to expose the underlying normative judgments embedded
within the biased prototypes to get at precisely what is objectionable about this
kind of cognitive shortcut.”285 In recent years, we have seen this very strategy
come to fruition, with burgeoning progressive movements like #MeToo and
Black Lives Matter advancing counter-narratives that center authentic stories of
racial and sexual harm.286 While still very much a work in progress, these
movements have the potential to dislodge the conventional narratives that
sustain biased prototypes.
Finally, much of Martha’s scholarship makes the case to use the doctrine
when you can.287 Nearly all her articles do this, and some plant seeds that have
borne fruit, as with her analysis on gender and part-time work.288 She carefully
maps the opening for courts to adopt a tougher approach to the factor other than
sex defense under the Equal Pay Act, with the goal of narrowing the room for
employers to explain disproportionate gaps in pay between part-time and fulltime workers without stronger business justifications.289 It has taken nearly
three decades, but some lower courts have been tightening up the defense
(albeit, not yet specifically in challenges to part-time workers’ pay).290 Other
efforts to work with legal doctrine have found a more hostile judicial reception,
as with Martha’s threading of the needle on constructive discharge to make the
doctrine more plaintiff-friendly, an approach that was rejected by the Supreme
Court a few months after the article’s publication.291 Even so, the article’s
valiant attempt to broaden employer responsibility for the injuries caused by
285 Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias, supra note 7, at 803; see

also id. at 806 (acknowledging that the process of subverting biased prototypes is not easy;
that it “calls for noncomparative strategies that take us quite a long way from the equalitybased remedies for intentional disparate treatment”).
286 ‘#MeToo Gave Me Confidence to Report My Sexual Abuse,’ BBC (Sept. 22, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-york-north-yorkshire-58624904 [https://perma.cc
/L4HY-MVBA]; Char Adams, A Movement, a Slogan, a Rallying Cry: How Black Lives
Matter Changed America’s View on Race, NBC News (Dec. 29, 2020), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/movement-slogan-rallying-cry-how-black-lives-matterchanged-america-n1252434 (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
287 Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work, supra note 3, at 712–13.
288 See, e.g., id.
289 Id. at 746–48.
290 See, e.g., Rizo v. Yovina, 950 F.3d 1217, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(overruling earlier circuit precedent that accepted salary history as a factor other than sex
and restricting the defense to legitimate, job-related factors such as experience,
qualifications, and prior job performance).
291 See Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (2004) (analyzing constructive discharge as a
“dilemma” that brings to the forefront the crisis brewing in Title VII’s rigid categorical
approach and urging courts to engage in a more forthright inquiry into how to attribute
responsibility for it). But see Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 131–32 (2004)
(holding that constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action and allowing
employers to avoid liability with an affirmative defense).
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sexual harassment may yet help bolster more plaintiff-friendly approaches to
the principles supporting employer liability for supervisor misconduct.292
One of my favorite examples of Martha’s persistence in refusing to give up
on a feminist reconstruction of law comes from her review of a book by social
science scholars critiquing the convention of relying on the market to excuse
gendered pay inequities.293 Martha fundamentally agrees with and further
elaborates their argument that both courts and employers too readily default to
“the market” as the explanation for paying female-dominated jobs less than
predominantly male jobs, even when the market does not actually support
paying women less.294 Martha’s point-by-point review of the book’s argument
situates their critique in the case law and explains why the case studies the
authors use reveal the hollowness of the market-based explanation that courts
uncritically accepted in those cases.295 But Martha parts ways with the authors
when they conclude that disparate impact doctrine is ill-suited to scrutinizing
market justifications and too close to the long-discarded comparable worth
theory.296 In an exhaustive review of disparate impact doctrine, Martha
demonstrates that the very insight at the heart of the authors’ argument—that
employers are not passive followers of the market but rely on their own
institutional practices to set pay—provides the building blocks for legal theory
to overcome judicial resistance to disparate impact pay claims.297 At bottom,
Martha’s difference with the authors boils down to her optimism about the
potential for legal theory to move legal doctrine, not through a process of
rationalization alone, but through struggle, aided by the right intellectual
tools.298
With the unpredictable and ever-changing COVID-19 pandemic have come
intense dislocations that have renewed our sense of urgency to reconsider work,
vulnerable workers, and their sacrifices. Scholars, advocates, and practitioners
are in the midst of fresh conversations about changing the nature of work,
292 Although Justice Ginsburg authored the Court’s opinion in Suders, she dissented in
a later case that adopted a narrow definition of a “supervisor” for purposes of imposing
vicarious liability for supervisor misconduct. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421,
454–55 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for a broader approach to vicarious
liability and emphasizing the harms of unremedied injuries to harassment victims under the
Court’s narrower approach). The rift on the Court in Vance shows dissension among the
Justices over how high to set the hurdle for vicarious liability. See also Martha Chamallas,
Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1315, 1315 (2014) (critiquing the Court’s turn to agency principles to limit vicarious
liability for sexual harassment and other discrimination claims).
293 See generally Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001)
(reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)).
294 See id. at 612.
295 Id. at 596.
296 Id. at 600.
297 Id. at 607, 610–12.
298 See id. at 612.
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working less, valuing it more, and easing the gendered burdens that beset the
most vulnerable workers.299 Before COVID hit, no one would have predicted
the opportunities of the present moment. It is far too soon to say what, if any,
legal and social changes will emerge, but we are reminded that even systemic
societal failures can spark change, as they expose fractures and instability in the
existing order. Every crisis is an opportunity to revisit what once seemed
unrealistic and too radical, if we can fend off complacency and hopelessness.
XI. FEMINISTS HELP OTHER WOMEN (AND MEN), AND NEVER LOSE THEIR
SENSE OF HUMOR
While I have focused on Martha’s scholarship, I cannot conclude my
contribution to this Festschrift without saying something about the person
behind the scholar. Without exaggeration, as a mentor, she is simply the best. If
you have ever had the good fortune to have Martha read a draft of your work
(and we are a large club because Martha is a generous reader), then you know
of what I speak. Martha’s insight as a reader and editor is truly a gift; she sees
the kernel of an idea even when it is covered in a field of weeds. She treats it as
a fragile seedling and crafts a set of instructions for how to water, fertilize,
nurture, and grow it into a mature stalk.300 If the academy had more mentors
and readers like Martha, we would all be better and stronger.
As valuable as Martha’s generosity in reading other scholars’ work (though
that is hard to top) is her sharing of wisdom as a sage academic who has seen it
all. Even (now more than) two decades ago, when I joined the Pitt Law faculty,
Martha was the wise stateswoman of the faculty. She knew, and shared, how to
walk the tightropes, dodge the landmines, and where the bodies were buried.
She was tireless and stalwart in the pursuit to diversify the faculty, always ready
to beat back the old tropes set in opposition with an astute and diplomatic
rejoinder. But my favorite is the unfiltered Martha, with her trademark sense of
humor that never fails to lift up the absurdities of academic life, and life in
general, and hold them to the light for a good laugh. Sometimes this sense of
humor comes with what my grandmother used to call “language.”301 Let’s just
say, it is probably best not to answer a call from Martha on speaker when in the
299 E.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Working While Mothering During the Pandemic and

Beyond, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2021); Arianne Renan Barzilay & Ana BenDavid, Platform Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393
(2017); Anne Branigan, Can Four-Day Workweeks Help Women? More Companies Are
Trying It Out., LILY (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.thelily.com/can-four-day-workweekshelp-women-more-companies-are-trying-it-out/ [https://perma.cc/K8W3-QVDY]; Edward
Lempinen, Very Big Changes Are Coming Very Fast to the American Workplace, BERKELEY
NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://news.berkeley.edu/2021/07/01/very-big-changes-are-comingvery-fast-to-the-american-workplace/ (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
300 She would surely redline this cringy metaphor, but I got carried away!
301 Let no one deny us the pleasure of uncensored conversations. Cf. Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (detailing facts of partners objecting to plaintiff’s
swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul language”).

470

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 83:3

car with the kids. Amidst all these lessons, perhaps the most important thing I
learned from Martha about being a feminist in the academy is this: oftentimes
the best medicine for exhaustion, frustration, and life’s myriad challenges is
laughter. Martha’s brand of equanimity, intellect, and mad humor is a beacon
for legal academics, and lights a path for feminist scholars and critical theorists
in these challenging times.

